As is the case with most pre‐modern philosophers of India, very little historical information is available about Bhartṛ‐hari. There are many interesting legends, some turned into extensive plays and poems, current about him. However, it is impossible to determine on their basis even whether there was only one philosopher called Bhartṛ‐hari. The appellation “philosopher” could unquestionably be applied to the author or authors of at least two Sanskrit works that are commonly ascribed to Bhartṛ‐hari.

We will prove in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory without axiom of choice that the transitive hull R* of a relation R is not much “bigger” than R itself. As a measure for the size of a relation we introduce the notion of κ+-narrowness using surjective Hartogs numbers rather than the usul injective Hartogs values. The main theorem of this paper states that the transitive hull of a κ+-narrow relation is κ+-narrow. As an immediate corollary we obtain that, for every infinite cardinal (...) κ, the class HCκ of all κ-hereditary sets is a set with von Neumann rank ϱ(HCκ) ≤ κ+. Moreover, ϱ(HCκ) = κ+ if and only if κ is singular, otherwise ϱ(HCκ) = κ. The statements of the corollary are well known in the presence of the axiom of choice (AC). To prove them without AC - as carried through here - is, however, much harder. A special case of the corollary (κ = ω1, i.e., the class HCω1 of all hereditarily countable sets) has been treated independently by T. JECH. (shrink)

This volume provides a detailed resume of current knowledge about the classical Indian Philosophical systems of Nyaya and Vaisesika in their earlier stages, i.e ...

The main question that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) pose is whether “what and how we see is functionally independent from what and how we think, know, desire, act, and so forth” (sect. 2, para. 1). We synthesize a collection of concerns from an interdisciplinary set of coauthors regarding F&S's assumptions and appeals to intuition, resulting in their treatment of visual perception as context-free.

The areas of interest of the scholar of religious studies, Karl E. Grozinger, are diverse. His research is concentrated on the religious and cultural history of Judaism throughout the ages: Israel in antiquity, the era of rabbinical traditional literature, philosophy of religion during the Middle Ages, the kabbalistic tradition, as well as Jewish thinkers and devout movements in contemporary times. On the occasion of Professor Grozinger's seventieth birthday, numerous scholars present the first fruits of their current research as a (...) first look into the tendencies of future research in Jewish studies. In accordance with this scholar's broad interests, the volume Jewish Lifeworlds and Jewish Thought, edited by Nathanael Riemer, is comprised of contributions to a wide variety of topics of Jewish cultural history.With contributions by Hermann Lichtenberger, Hanna Liss, Ronit Meroz, Yoav Elstein, Susanne Talabardon, Nathanael Riemer, Giuseppe Veltri, Dirk Westerkamp, Thomas Meyer, Daniel Jutte, Frederek Musall, Robert Jutte, J. Friedrich Battenberg, Admiel Kosman, Rella Kushelevsky, Elvira Grozinger, Simon Bronner, Avidov Lipsker, Jascha Nemtsov, Rebekka Denz, Micha Brumlik, Micha? Galas, Manja Herrmann, Hans-Michael Haussig, Anat Feinberg, Adam Lipszyc, Vivian Liska, Julius H. Schoeps, Edward D'browa, Ewa Geller, Manfred Voigts, Mordechai Lewy and Stanislaw Krajewski. (shrink)

A collaboration has been arranged for the preparation and publication in three dual-language volumes within the Hegel series presently in preparation by Fr. Frommanns Verlag of new critical editions of Hegel’s 1821 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, to be included in one volume with the up to now unpublished first form of his Encyclopedia, and Hegel’s 1824 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, in two volumes. The new German editions are to be prepared by Professor Dr. K.-H. Ilting. The (...) English translations are to be prepared by Professor Darrel E. Christensen. The anticipation is that the first of these editions will appear some time in 1973. (shrink)

A collaboration has been arranged for the preparation and publication in three dual-language volumes within the Hegel series presently in preparation by Fr. Frommanns Verlag of new critical editions of Hegel’s 1821 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, to be included in one volume with the up to now unpublished first form of his Encyclopedia, and Hegel’s 1824 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, in two volumes. The new German editions are to be prepared by Professor Dr. K.-H. Ilting. The (...) English translations are to be prepared by Professor Darrel E. Christensen. The anticipation is that the first of these editions will appear some time in 1973. (shrink)

There are two main meanings of "Dasein" in Jaspers' Philosophie : the "that" of whatever can be encountered empirically, and the immediateness, the "there" of subjects. The author attempts to show the ultimate connection between these two meanings of "Dasein," and how, for Jaspers, "Dasein" is the basis for the realization of being. The book displays an excellent command of Jaspers' works and of the philosophical problematics for which Jaspers is significant.--L. H. E.

There are two main meanings of "Dasein" in Jaspers' Philosophie : the "that" of whatever can be encountered empirically, and the immediateness, the "there" of subjects. The author attempts to show the ultimate connection between these two meanings of "Dasein," and how, for Jaspers, "Dasein" is the basis for the realization of being. The book displays an excellent command of Jaspers' works and of the philosophical problematics for which Jaspers is significant.--L. H. E.

Form of Thought and Presentational Gesture in Karl Popper and E. H. Gombrich The paper deals with common elements and differences in Popper and Gombrich, especially concerning their forms of thought and presentational gesture. Among others it considers the model of common sense which was basal for both of them as well as the similarities of searchlight theory (Popper) and some postulates of Gestalt psychology (Gombrich). At the end it analyses their approaches to historiography with special focusing on Gombrich's (...) comments on the concept of social history of art. (shrink)

E. H. Gombrich in 1968: Methodological Individualism and the Contradictions of Conservatism The commonalities Gombrich affirmed between his own positions on science, politics, and art and those of his friend Karl Popper are key to understanding both his work on the history of style and the conservative fulminations on method he published from the early 1950s onwards. United with Popper by their shared experience of exile from fascism, Gombrich failed to register the amateurish character of Popper's political theory and (...) that his aversion to notions of social determination disabled the historian. Popper's skepticism regarding the ontological status of social collectivities and rejection of the concept of totality reinforced Gombrich's suspicions of holistic analysis and led him to fall back on naturalistic descriptions of individuals acting in a social world glued together by such commonsensical categories as "traditions" and "institutions". In this regard he is representative of the common aversion to sociology of the British intellectual establishment in the early Cold War. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts ed. by Salim Kemal, Ivan Gaskell, and Daniel W. ConwayHans SeigfriedSalim Kemal, Ivan Gaskell, and Daniel W. Conway, editors. Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xv + 351. Cloth, $69.95.The editors contend that much contemporary reflection on the relationship between philosophy and art has been shaped by Nietzsche’s “experiments with an ‘aesthetic politics’ and a politization of aesthetics.” (...) For this reason, all contributions examine Nietzsche’s aesthetic account of the origins and ends of philosophy and the transformative power of aesthetic activity in social and personal life. They concentrate on his idea of a strictly aesthetic justification of existence. The editors argue that Nietzsche, more [End Page 686] than other philosophers, understood “art as the basic transformative impulse known to human experience,” that he replaced the traditional theoretical justification of existence with an exclusively aesthetic justification, and that he not only theorized about art, but also had artistic aspirations, and that this “dual relationship to art” accounts for his continued influence. They hope that this collection will “set out the ground for future debate” of these matters.The volume is well organized. Grouped in three parts, four essays discuss basic aspects of Nietzsche’s idea of art as a transformative power, three his understanding of particular arts and the influence of his ideas on them, and five the connection between the transformative power of art and the values that guide our transactions in social and political matters. In Part One, E. Behler, M. Nussbaum, A. Del Caro, and R. Havas discuss the power of art in ironic distancing in passion, “Dionysian rapture,” and the justification of existence. In Part Two, S. Bann explores Nietzsche’s ideas about historical consciousness and representation in French romanticism, T. W. White examines the connection between Utopian vision and genuine truth in Klimt’s “Beethoven Frieze,” and J. Carvalho discusses “improvising without memory” in jazz as an illustration of Nietzsche’s Dionysian model for self-transformation. In Part Three, F. Jenkins compares and contrasts moral and aesthetic self-formation, H. Staten reconstructs “the common matrix of aristocratic-authoritarian and democratic-liberationist tendencies in Nietzsche’s writings,” S. Kemal develops some implications of the final rejection of the “artists’ metaphysics” that Nietzsche still defended in his annus mirabilis (1886), D. W. Conway scrutinizes the political and aesthetic roles philosophers could and should play, and C. Crawford reviews some physiological processes involved in aesthetic transformation in the arts of dance, song, laughter, etc.Although the importance of Nietzsche in the discussion of art in our culture cannot be overestimated, one might want to quarrel with the editors’ claim that there are no other philosophers who believed as strongly as did Nietzsche that art was “the basic transformative impulse” in human experience. The same view was carefully developed by Dewey in Art as Experience and expanded in many other contributions to cover almost all areas of experience. But Nietzsche’s view of art and his idea that all human efforts need a strictly aesthetic justification still belong to the very best we have, and they deserve further discussion more than anything else in his writings.While these essays go a long way toward explaining the transformative power of art and aesthetic justification, they ultimately do not make clear what precisely Nietzsche’s reasons were for insisting that the meaning of existence can be justified only aesthetically and not conceptually, or why he thought that human experience is a process of transfiguration, or transformation, and not one of representation or conformation. It might help to review the reasons Nietzsche initially gave for abandoning the belief that existence can be transparently organized by the received “mechanism of concepts, judgments, and inferences,” and why he rejected the principle of sufficient reason as the basis of knowledge and dismissed the idea of “correct perception.” His description of experience as the “aesthetic operation”—Verhalten, not Verhältnis, as translated—of tentatively transferring things into a delicately woven web of changing human needs and interests does not mean that Nietzsche abandoned the conceptualization of experience. [End Page 687] Rather, it shows why we must recognize conceptualization as an... (shrink)

ABSTRACT Between 1920 and 1922, the University of Bristol biochemist, Maximilian Nierenstein, published four papers in a series exploring the structure of catechin in the Journal of the Chemical Society. The Society then abruptly refused to accept any more of his papers on catechin, or any other subject. It provided him with no reasons for the embargo until 1925. It then transpired that Nierenstein was boycotted because it was deemed that he had not responded adequately to criticisms of his work (...) made by his rival in catechin research, the German natural products chemist, Karl Freudenberg. It was not until 1929 that, as a result of a petition by a group of his former Bristol pupils and friends, that Nierenstein was again permitted to publish in the Society’s journal. The paper explores the Chemical Society’s treatment of Nierenstein in detail, sheds new light on his career and his reaction to the Society’s unprecedented boycott, examines some of the structural chemistry involved in the disputes, and discusses whether Nierenstein’s research deserves the label of ‘bad science’. (shrink)

One of the most important books of the twentieth century, Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies is an uncompromising defense of liberal democracy and a powerful attack on the intellectual origins of totalitarianism. Popper was born in 1902 to a Viennese family of Jewish origin. He taught in Austria until 1937, when he emigrated to New Zealand in anticipation of the Nazi annexation of Austria the following year, and he settled in England in 1949. Before the annexation, (...) Popper had written mainly about the philosophy of science, but from 1938 until the end of the Second World War he focused his energies on political philosophy, seeking to diagnose the intellectual origins of German and Soviet totalitarianism. The Open Society and Its Enemies was the result. An immediate sensation when it was first published in two volumes in 1945, Popper's monumental achievement has attained legendary status on both the Left and Right and is credited with inspiring anticommunist dissidents during the Cold War. Arguing that the spirit of free, critical inquiry that governs scientific investigation should also apply to politics, Popper traces the roots of an opposite, authoritarian tendency to a tradition represented by Plato, Marx, and Hegel. In a substantial new introduction written for this edition, acclaimed political philosopher Alan Ryan puts Popper's landmark work in biographical, intellectual, and historical context. Also included is a personal essay by eminent art historian E.H. Gombrich, in which he recounts the story of the book's eventual publication despite numerous rejections and wartime deprivations. (shrink)

There are two motivations commonly ascribed to historical actors for taking up statistics: to reduce complicated data to a mean value (e.g., Quetelet), and to take account of diversity (e.g., Galton). Different motivations will, it is assumed, lead to different methodological decisions in the practice of the statistical sciences. Karl Pearson and W. F. R. Weldon are generally seen as following directly in Galton’s footsteps. I argue for two related theses in light of this standard interpretation, based on a (...) reading of several sources in which Weldon, independently of Pearson, reflects on his own motivations. First, while Pearson does approach statistics from this "Galtonian" perspective, he is, consistent with his positivist philosophy of science, utilizing statistics to simplify the highly variable data of biology. Weldon, on the other hand, is brought to statistics by a rich empiricism and a desire to preserve the diversity of biological data. Secondly, we have here a counterexample to the claim that divergence in motivation will lead to a corresponding separation in methodology. Pearson and Weldon, despite embracing biometry for different reasons, settled on precisely the same set of statistical tools for the investigation of evolution. (shrink)

Rombach, H. Die Gegenwart der Philosophie.--Möller, J. Philosophie als Antihumanismus?--Schaeffler, R. Zum Verhältnis von transzendentaler und historischer Reflexion.--Balmer, H. P. Produktivität und Rezeptivität.--Marx, W. Das Bedürfnis der Philosophie.--Mader, J. Philosophie als Kritik.--Hommes, U. Sein und Sinn.--Sobrevilla, D. Ortega und der deutsche Idealismus.--Kohlenberger, H. Robert Musils philosophischer Anspruch.--Schwartländer, J. Die Menschenrechte und die Notwendigkeit einer praktischen Weltorientierung.--Heintel, E. Vom Sinn der Freundschaft.--Oeser, E. Die wissenschaftstheoretische Wende der Philosophie.--Simon, J. Zu einem philosophischen Begriff der Kausalität.--Schäfer, L. Der wissenschaftstheoretische Status synthetischer Urteile a (...) priori.--Lütterfelds, W. Das kategoriale Apriori des Erfahrungsfortschritts. (shrink)

The burden of this theorem, stated informally, is that when a hypothesis h is maximally independent of the evidence — that is, it goes wholly beyond the evidence —, then the probability p(h, e) increases when the evidence e is weakened; and hence, the weaker is the evidence, the greater is the probabilistic support.

Die Idee des absoluten Wissens schließt die Idee der Begründung dieses Wissens durch und aus sich selbst ein. Das absolute Wissen unterscheidet sich in sich selber in den Grund des Wissens und dessen Folge, eben das Wissen. Das Wissen ist also die Identität des Wissens mit seiner Negation, dem Sein an sich. Husserls Phänomenologie will die radikale Ausführung der als absolutes Wissen oder Wahrheit strenge Wissenschaft verstandenen Philosophie sein. Sofern das absolute Wissen ein Wissen ist, muß die Phänomenologie deshalb die (...) Identität seiner beiden Pole herausstellen ; d.h. durch die phänomenologische Reduktion darf nichts vom Ansichsein oder der Welt verloren gehen. Sofern das Wissen dagegen absolut ist, muß das negative Verhältnis zwischen den Polen Welt und Bewußtsein einen Abgrund aufreißen ; der wechselseitige Ausschluß beider nimmt die absolute Form des schlechthinnigen Widerspruchs an. Durch die Konstitution der Bewußtseinsgegenständlichkeiten kommt also etwas vom Bewußtsein völlig Verschiedenes, eben die Welt, zustande. Die Form der phänomenologischen Grundbegriffe Intentionalität, Reduktion und Konstitution ist demnach die der wechselseitigen Implikation zweier sich gegenseitig zugleich auch aufhebender Momente. Da diese Aufhebung zugleich auch die Beständigung und Bestätigung des Aufgehobenen ist, bleibt als ihr Resultat nicht nichts übrig, sondern eine in ihren Grundlagen verworrene und doppelgesichtige Philosophie. Die Grundstruktur der Phänomenologie äußert sich in Paradoxien, deren Ursprung und Notwendigkeit Husserl nicht mehr aufgeklärt hat. Der Rechtsgrund zu diesem Unaufgeklärtlassen liegt darin, daß erst nach der Aufrichtung und Durchführung der Phänomenologie, d.h. an ihrem Ende, eine Reflexion auf die Phänomenologie als solche und im Ganzen vollzogen werden konnte. Der Rechtsgrund für diese Totalreflexion liegt aber seinerseits ebenfalls und in gleichem Maße in der Idee des absoluten Wissens beschlossen, welche die absolute Selbstbegründung des Wissens fordert oder, wie Husserl sagt, die Reduktion auf die äußersten Horizonte. Der äußerste Horizont der Phänomenologie (als des absoluten Wissens) ist aber die Phänomenologie selbst. So ist die Reflexion auf die Grundlagen der Phänomenologie einerseits ein Unternehmen innerhalb des absoluten Wissens und der Phänomenologie, wie sie andererseits auch erst an derem Ende, also jenseits der Phänomenologie, vollzogen werden kann. Dieser Widerspruch im Bestimmen des Wesens der Phänomenologie bewahrheitet die Bestimmung dieses Wesens als des Widerspruchswesens schlechthin. Die Phänomenologie bildet demnach die Bewegung, sich bzw. die Idee des absoluten Wissens selber aufzuheben. Dies ist aber nicht die Feststellung eines „Scheiterns” des phänomenologischen Projekts. Vielmehr hat dieser Sachverhalt positive Bedeutung : Die Phänomenologie verendlicht sich selber zu einer Philosophie, um sich selbst zu überleben in der Aufhebung dieser ihrer Endlichkeit auf die Philosophie als solche hin. Durch das Übergehen der unendlichen Idee in die Endlichkeit entfaltet diese sich in sich selber zu ihrer wahren Unendlichkeit. Die Idee des absoluten Wissens ist also nicht eine abstrakte und leblose Chimäre, welcher Husserl in seiner Phänomenologie nachgejagt wäre. Sie bildet im Gegenteil die Bewegung der inneren Selbstveränderung des Absoluten und ist die Selbstbewegung seiner Idee. (shrink)

The paper builds on a simply typed term system ${\cal PR}^\omega $ providing a notion of partial primitive recursive functional on arbitrary Scott domains $D_\sigma$ that includes a suitable concept of parallelism. Computability on the partial continuous functionals seems to entail that Kleene's schema of higher type simultaneous course-of-values recursion (SCVR) is not reducible to partial primitive recursion. So an extension ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$ is studied that is closed under SCVR and yet stays within the realm of subrecursiveness. The twist (...) are certain type 1 Gödel recursors ${\cal R}_k$ for simultaneous partial primitive recursion. Formally, the value ${\cal R}_k\vec{g}\vec{H} x i$ is a function $f_i$ of type $\iota \to \iota$ , however, ${\cal R}_k$ is modelled such that $f_i$ is a finite element of $D_{\iota\to\iota}$ or in other words, a partial sequence. It is shown that the Ackermann function is not definable in ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$. (shrink)

Die Philosophie Karl Leonhard Reinholds (1757-1823) findet heute vermehrt Beachtung. Während dieser Denker lange Zeit als Popularisator Kants, als Vorläufer Fichtes oder als tatsachenphilosophischer Antipode Schellings und Hegels wahrgenommen wurde und gemeinhin im Ruf eines unsteten und unselbständigen Geistes stand, ist seit einigen Jahrzehnten eine Gegentendenz feststellbar: Reinholds Denkentfaltung wird zunehmend in ihrem gesamten Umfang sowie als eigenwilliger und innovativer Ansatz innerhalb der postkantischen Systemphilosophie zur Kenntnis genommen. Mehr und mehr wird anerkannt, dass Reinhold entscheidende Anstöße zur Entstehung des (...) deutschen Idealismus gegeben und diese Strömung zugleich auf der Grundlage von Einsichten, die in die Richtung der Phänomenologie und Sprachphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts weisen, kritisiert hat. Die in diesem Band vereinigten Beiträge gehen auf die I. Internationale Reinhold-Tagung zurück, die vom 14. bis 18. März 1998 in Bad Homburg stattgefunden hat. Sie geben systematische Fragestellungen und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Kontexte aus Reinholds kantischer Phase der Elementarphilosophie, aus der Periode seiner Zusammenarbeit mit Fichte und Jacobi sowie aus seiner sprachphilosophisch orientierten Spätzeit wieder. Alles in allem spiegeln sie das gegenwärtige Bedürfnis, Reinhold zu entdecken, sein Denken und Schaffen in seinen Wandlungen und in seiner thematischen Breite aufzuarbeiten und nachzuvollziehen. Zudem sind sie repräsentativ für die aktuell bestehenden vielfältigen Zugänge zu diesem produktiven Philosophen. (shrink)